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I. Abstract  
This research explores the question, “To what extent has the ‘Deal of the Century’ impacted 
Palestinian aid organizations, and how might it impact them in the future?” The significance of 
this question lies in the fact that the “Deal of the Century” claims to solve one of the longest and 
most complex conflicts, yet it has not been sufficiently analyzed from a Palestinian perspective 
nor a humanitarian perspective. Furthermore, by presenting scholarly critiques of the deal and 
aid worker’s concerns, my hope is that an American audience may be convinced of the 
complicity of our government in devising a failed and harmful plan, develop empathy for 
peacebuilding in the region, and support a more inclusive approach when our government 
negotiates peace deals in the future. 
To answer my research question, I interviewed ten people involved with organizations who 
give aid to Palestinians. I asked them questions regarding potential changes in their missions and 
objectives, their feelings about the deal, their knowledge of its details, and how it relates to 
Palestinian refugees. By grouping their responses into common themes, I present a small case 
study of what elements of this deal worried Palestinian aid workers, what they all agreed and 
disagreed upon, and what they speculated about. My findings showed that all participants were 
opposed to the deal and generally tried to ignore its implications for their beneficiaries, operating 
according to international law instead. They all hope that this deal is not realized after the 
removal of U.S. President Trump from office. In contrast, my participants could not agree on 
how severely the mere proposal of the deal had impacted their work. However, I believe that 
there is enough evidence to conclude that their mentality and cause have been harmed since the 
deal was proposed almost a year ago.  
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Lastly, this research found there is an overall need for a more inclusive peace deal, which can 
incorporate lessons learned from past peace deal failures and listen to aid organizations who 
represent the Palestinian cause. All participants proved to have great insight into the needs of 
refugees, the requirements for peace, and the roots of the conflict. I learned from them that, to 
even begin to create peace, a successful deal needs to involve the parties who represent the 
people involved, can advocate for their people’s needs, and are willing to make compromises.  
 
II. Introduction  
On January 28, 2020, the Trump administration announced a proposal to help solve the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict1. The President and media outlets have referred to it as "the Deal of 
the Century" for addressing infamous Final Status Issues to which the two parties could not 
agree, such as formal borders, mutual statehood recognition, control of Jerusalem, ownership of 
the Syrian Golan Heights, the status of Israeli settlements in the West Bank, the Palestinian Right 
of Return, limitations on the Gaza Strip, and the division of resources2. Much to the frustration of 
Palestinian advocates, the "solutions" proposed for these issues included: redrawing the 
boundaries to incorporate illegal West Bank settlements into the state of Israel, recognition of the 
state of Israel and recognition for a "future" Palestinian state (if ever established), recognizing 
Jerusalem as the “undivided capital” of Israel, maintaining the illegally-annexed Golan Heights 
as a part of Israel, and denying displaced Palestinians/their families the right to return to their 
former land3. It also includes new ideas and territory which has not historically been a part of 
 
1 Bowen, 2020. 
2 "Peace to Prosperity…”, 2020. 
3 "Peace to Prosperity…”, 2020. 
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Israeli-Palestinian talks4. These include the complete demilitarization of Palestine, annexation of 
the fertile Jordan Valley, a tunnel connecting the West Bank to the Gaza Strip, building an island 
for a Gazan port/airport, and the investment of around fifty billion dollars in the entire Israeli-
Palestinian region5. Formally titled "Peace to Prosperity: A Vision to Improve the Lives of the 
Palestinian and Israeli People,"6 this controversial deal has many questioning the future for 
Palestinians, as further annexation and power concessions seem inevitable. Even though 
President Trump has not been elected for another term, there are reasonable concerns that 
President-elect Biden will not reverse the precedents set by the Trump administration for Israel-
Palestine. While the United States continues to maintain a close relationship with Israel and 
contribute billions of dollars to the state, there is a strong likelihood that, at a minimum, portions 
of this deal will come to fruition.  
As of the month of this final composition, December 2020, the West Bank's annexation along 
Israeli settlement lines has been "postponed" but not canceled, due to mounting protests in the 
region and the deals Israel brokered with the UAE and other Arab nations. Whether the plans for 
annexation will be carried out this year or later, Palestinian organizations must still prepare for a 
changing Palestine and what this deal could mean for their work. This paper explores scholarly 
concerns about the "Deal of the Century," the complicated nature of a Palestinian leadership 
which cannot provide sufficient advocacy for its people, the importance of Palestinian relief 
organizations in filling gaps in advocacy and aid, questions about the needs of Palestinian 
refugees, and an analysis of where past peace deals went wrong. In light of this context, my 
research explores how Palestinian aid organizations are adapting to this latest deal — or not. Do 
 
4 "Peace to Prosperity…”, 2020. 
5 Landau, 2019. 
6 "Peace to Prosperity…”, 2020. 
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they have new initiatives targeted at addressing "the Deal of the Century"? Are these 
organizations partnering with non-Palestinian groups to amplify their power as the voice of 
Palestinian leadership becomes smaller? Do the Palestinian internal and external refugees which 
they serve have different needs now? Are organizations changing their missions or objectives? 
Do they even feel the need to perform any changes at all? This paper has attempted to answer 
these questions. 
As a Humanitarian Assistance and Crisis Management student, I hope to learn how 
humanitarian organizations continue to operate in the face of intractable and ever-changing 
conflicts, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This study will be unique due to its examination 
of aid during a present-day conflict with a current "peace plan" in the works, which could alter 
the nature of the conflict any day. In fact, while performing this research in 2020, the United 
States Presidential election, deals between Arab nations and Israel, and other geopolitical 
developments led me to continually rewrite and revise my conclusions and predictions about the 
deal's impacts. My hope with this research is to lead others to understand more about the deal, 
and the complex status of the people and region it concerns. I further justify this research by 
asserting that the Deal of the Century is a critical issue for our time, which I believe will have 
long-term implications for one of the most prolonged humanitarian crises in the world. 
This topic is one of personal interest to me. As a new scholar of Humanitarian Assistance and 
Crisis Management, I have been studying how the politicization of aid and views from changing 
foreign administrations can decide the fate of assistance for a particular group of refugees. The 
safety and wellbeing of a group of refugees should not necessarily depend upon whether the 
force which caused their exile has allied itself with wealthy and powerful countries. Yet, 
throughout this research, I have discovered how the money and influence of my home country, 
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the United States, has defined and undermined refugee protections for Palestinians and 
threatened the legitimacy of the humanitarian organizations supplying them with aid. This paper 
has caused me to learn more about this deal's bias in favor of Israel and how it provides barriers 
for Palestinian assistance from independent NGOs and INGOs.  
This deal has been crafted despite many international resolutions which define Israeli actions 
as those of an occupying presence and de-legitimize items like Israeli settlements7. Therefore, I 
also set out to learn more about whether Palestinian aid organizations believe they can rely on 
international law anymore, and what bodies they turn to for recognizing and legitimizing their 
work. I have learned from my time spent studying refugees that the challenges and realities of 
Palestinian refugees often defy other refugees' status quo. Palestinian refugees are the only group 
in the world to be allocated an entire UN organization (UNRWA) dedicated to delivering 
humanitarian assistance specifically to them8. Therefore, my research on UNRWA and 
interviews with similar Palestinian aid organizations has also grown my understanding of their 
status as a unique group in the refugee world. Lastly, it is essential to conduct this research 
because the Deal of the Century is new and has not been thoroughly studied. While the politics 
behind the deal have been a popular topic of discussion in the media, its impact on Palestinian 
refugees and IDPs has mostly been ignored, especially in American reporting. How Palestinian 
aid organizations can or cannot adapt their work in response to this deal may change how the 
world views this conflict in the future. 
 
III. Literature Review 
 
7 Bowen, 2020. 
8 UNRWA.org, “Who We Are”, 2020. 
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A. Current Theories on the Deal 
The "Deal of the Century" is a loose two-state solution which grants disproportionate power 
to the state of Israel and ends the discussion for displaced Palestinians to return to anywhere 
controlled and claimed by Israel. For organizations like UNRWA, which advocate for the Right 
of Return and serve Palestinian refugees as their mission, this deal is simply incompatible with 
their work. For that reason, a few scholars and publications who have analyzed the agreement 
assume that organizations like UNRWA would be forced to either change their mandate or 
ignore the deal entirely and refute its regulations for refugees. These are reasonable assumptions 
because UNRWA has historically relied on their United Nations mandate as superior to any laws 
or leaders that have attempted to undermine Palestinian refugees' status in the past9. However, 
due to the deal's novelty, there has simply not been enough research on how its proposal is 
affecting Palestinian organizations, nor how it would affect them if implemented.  
Al Jazeera news has conducted a rhetorical comparison of peace deals to show how this latest 
deal signifies a significant loss of power for Palestinians. By setting every significant Israeli-
Palestinian peace deal attempt side by side, they charted the difference in content and language 
over time. While words such as "the state of Israel" and "Jewish state" are being used repeatedly 
and comprise significant portions of the text, these two phrases have historically not factored into 
peace deal rhetoric since 1967 and 2020, respectively10. These new words are essential for Israel 
to frame the peace deal's context to fit their needs. In contrast, words which are practically 
crucial to Palestinian aid organizations on the ground like "Right of Return for refugees" and 
 
9 UNRWA Newsroom: Official Statements, 2020.  
10 Al Jazeera, 2020. 
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"occupation" are mentioned once for the former and not at all for the latter11. Clearly, this deal's 
language implies serious change for Palestinian politics and their refugee politics in particular. 
For a deal to bring about a durable peace, humanitarian actors need to be included in the 
conversation and understand the future of their work. 
Moreover, when describing the peace agreement, The Jerusalem Post has stated that this is 
the "first time a U.S. President has provided a detailed map of this kind."12 While past peace 
deals have failed to define and maintain clear borders for Israel and Palestine, this deal states 
exactly where the state of Israel would extend. It further includes that Palestinian refugees will 
not have the right to return to "Israel" (as defined by the borders in the deal), and only a small 
number would be allowed to return to a "future" Palestinian state.13 If a new Palestine is 
established in the future along these rigid lines, scholars have suggested that Palestinian 
organizations may be confined to working in these areas. For aid organizations, this means they 
could potentially lose the right to work in most of the places where they were mandated to serve 
and lose any hope of resettling refugees back in those areas.  
As the current deal stands, researchers and reporters have discovered that no Palestinian 
leadership was included in its drafting, nor were they consulted for their requests in a peace 
deal14. In 2019, before any of the plan's political details were revealed by the Trump 
administration, The German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) was at the 
forefront of discussing how the plan would disempower Palestinian political leadership and 
 
11 Al Jazeera, 2020. 
12 Harkov & Keinon, 2020. 
13 Harkov & Keinon, 2020. 
14 Asseburg, 2019. 
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threaten refugee welfare. In fact, while the Palestinian Authority and many Arab states were 
aware that a new "peace plan" was on the Trump agenda because of his campaign promises in 
2016, it was not clear that this would be a plan solely between the U.S. and Israel, which 
Palestinians would be told to accept upon its completion15. In an analysis of the deal from 
Haaretz, the deal "seem[s] to reflect a desire to appeal directly to the hearts of the Palestinians 
themselves while bypassing the leadership and presenting a vision for a brighter future that 
depends mainly on their readiness to cooperate."16 One of the first signs that this deal would be 
one-sided was when the United States completely stopped its funding for UNRWA in 2018, 
stating that the aid organization "perpetuates the refugee problem by encouraging refugees to 
insist on their status and Right of Return rather than integrating within their current host 
states."17 Groups like SWP were able to predict this deal's outcome before its unveiling, but even 
they are not sure of what the future holds for Palestinian aid organizations.  
B. The Division and Devaluation of Palestinian Leadership 
A powerful demonstration of a government’s legitimacy is when others recognize it as the 
entity to negotiate with on behalf of that government’s people. In light of this fact, it is perhaps 
shocking to consider that one of the largest Israeli-Palestinian peace deal attempts, the "Oslo 
Accords", was negotiated in secret without the knowledge of most of the Palestinian delegation's 
formal representatives18. Therefore, it is not surprising that many Palestinians viewed the accords 
as not in their interest, and the peace it established was doomed to fail. A sustainable peace deal 
 
15 Asseburg, 2019. 
16 Tibon et al., 2018. 
17 Tibon et al., 2018. 




must involve the individuals/bodies who hold recognizable influence over their group and can 
legitimately claim the ability to enforce the particulars of a peace deal. Even worse than the Oslo 
Accords, the Deal of the Century was only negotiated between the United States and Israel; 
neither of whom can truly claim the ability to influence and represent the Palestinian people.  
On the other hand, when the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was publicly engaged 
in peace talks with American and Israeli leaders at the end of the 20th century, they were staking 
their claim as speakers for Palestinian national interest. “Over time, the PLO has embraced a 
broader role, claiming to represent all Palestinians while running the Palestinian National 
Authority (PA)”19. Yet, scholars ironically maintain that the Palestinian Authority's international 
authority, which was given under the Oslo Accords, is fictitious20. They do not have sovereignty, 
jurisdiction, or ultimate control over the West Bank, Gaza strip, and East Jerusalem. Unlike 
traditional Weberian states, the Palestinian Authority still does not have a monopoly over the law 
and legitimate forms of violence within their territories. Understandably, it is difficult to 
maintain control over their borders, when Palestine's borders have changed drastically in the last 
century; and to enforce the law, when a surrounding country constantly enforces its law over 
their own. Despite this, the Palestinian Authority still holds on to public exhibitions of 
legitimacy. For example, a small group of members belonging to the Palestinian Authority enjoy 
greater access to the region and can travel more freely than other Palestinians due to a supposed 
recognition of their authority by Israel. The Palestinian Authority also uses traditional signifiers 
of statehood (such as a state capitol, national flag, and governmental ministries) to indicate that 
they govern over a recognizable state, even if other nations do not concede this recognition. 
 
19 History.com Editors, 2018.  
20 Khalidi, 1997. 
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Despite these displays of authority and unified control, Palestinian representation remains 
divided. The most visible groups who claim to represent Palestinians, the “Fatah” party in the 
PLO and the “Hamas” organization located in Gaza have split the Palestinian political identity as 
they both compete for power. After the start of Pan-Arabism, socialists were drawn to a new 
secular nationalist party led by Yasser Arafat, known as Fatah. According to scholars at the 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, anyone could join Fatah, so long as they believed in 
pushing out Israel, armed resistance, the Right of Return, and protection for refugees21. These 
concepts made Fatah extremely popular with Palestinians inspired by the militaristic 
revolutionary trend of the 1950s, who believed it was Palestine's time to fight back. In the 1960s, 
a series of "lone wolf" Palestinian acts of aggression were carried out. Arafat claimed the most 
extensive attack for Fatah, to make them appear more authentically of the people and more 
revolutionary than Egypt’s Nasser. Fatah might have remained the sole unifying force for the 
Palestinians if it had not been for outside influence, mainly the interests of Egypt and Jordan in 
the Palestinian territory. After the first Fatah-claimed attack in 1964, Nasser formed the 
“Palestine Liberation Organization” (PLO) to regain a foothold in the Palestinian cause. In 1967, 
Fatah joined the PLO, and Arafat became PLO Chairman in 1969.  
In the years that followed, persistent unrest, the 1970 Six Days' War, and Jordan's "Black 
September" led to the constant displacement of Palestinian leadership until the PLO was no 
longer within Palestinian soil. The insecurity of being on foreign territory made the PLO 
vulnerable representatives at best over the Palestinians. In 1987, the Palestinian people decided 
to take matters into their own hands, and the “First Intifada” occurred. Thus, marks the beginning 
 




of the Islamic resistance movement known as Hamas. The Intifada shocked both Israel and the 
PLO. Wanting to regain the people's trust and legitimacy, Fatah attempted to spin the aftermath 
of the Intifada to officially declare independence for the State of Palestine in 1988. Despite this, 
the increased security measures and resentment built between Israel and Gaza secured Hamas' 
de-facto control, who primarily took credit for the Intifada and continues to champion armed 
resistance in Gaza and a complete return for formerly Palestinian land. Hamas sees the growing 
fragility of the Palestinian Authority and the Israeli government’s fear of another rebellion as 
proof that the time for rule by the people is imminent. They predict Fatah will collapse, and the 
PLO will be eventually forced to recognize Hamas's legitimacy, perhaps even incorporating them 
into the organization. Hamas's strategy is to outlast the PLO's crumbling infrastructure, instead of 
disarming and making other changes that might tempt the PLO to accept Hamas as legitimate 
Palestinian power beforehand22. Only time will tell who will gain supremacy over the Palestinian 
voice, but in the meantime, the fractured leadership continues to weaken the Palestinian cause. 
C. An Explanation of UNRWA: The Largest Palestinian INGO 
Palestine has necessitated unprecedented concern and attention from the United Nations. 
Palestinian refugees are the only group to have their own UN agency, separate from UNHCR. 
For nearly 70 years, this agency known as UNRWA has expanded beyond advocating for 
refugee resettlement to perform social, medical, and educational services within five separate 
states/territories.23 UNRWA is a subsidiary body of the UN General Assembly, and the state of 
Palestine is an “observer state” of the UN. These facts contribute to UNRWA's need to 
constantly prove their legitimacy on the diplomatic front, a situation which only worsens as the 
 
22 al-Omari, 2015. 
23 UNRWA Newsroom: Official Statements, 2020. 
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Israeli-Palestinian conflict continues. Using traditional diplomatic methods, UNRWA often 
points to their UN-established mandate, reminds UN member states of the Security Council 
Resolutions relating to Palestinian refugees, and appeals to International Humanitarian Law 
when their beneficiaries are disproportionally attacked during the conflict. They also must 
continually proving to stakeholders and donor governments why their work is invaluable to 
humanitarianism. UNRWA has a written legal foundation to rely upon and the support of many 
international organizations, committees, councils, and peace treaties which have called for an 
end to the Palestinian refugee crisis. Some of these supporting bodies include the United Nations 
Security Council (according to Resolutions 242 and 338), the United Nations General Assembly 
(according to Resolution 194), and numerous treaties which form the basis of customary law 
(such as the Taba Summit, the Camp David Accords, the Oslo Accords, the Clinton Parameters, 
the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, and more). However, their legal legitimacy is a double-edged 
sword because, as the conflict continues, Israelis and Palestinians alike have witnessed how the 
United Nations does not seem to have the power to enforce its support for the Palestinian cause. 
As the conflict became protracted, UNRWA found that expecting a comprehensive and 
immediate "Right of Return" (the Palestinian call for resettlement to their previous homes and 
lands) was unrealistic at this point in politics. However, instead of ignoring that fact, the 
organization reconsidered its mission, which is what I believe sets UNRWA apart from other 
humanitarian organizations. Instead of leaving the refugees to their fate, UNRWA now cares for 
them in the humanitarian sphere by offering aid on the ground, while simultaneously pushing for 
policy change and the Right of Return in the diplomatic sphere. According to an essay in 
Humanitarian Diplomacy, the mission of UNRWA has shifted from refugee resettlement 
towards an assurance that these refugees "would be supported and protected until such time as 
17 
 
there is a comprehensive political settlement on the question of Palestine."24 However, this more 
inclusive mission has changed UNRWA to operate like a small-scale government, with a 
massive impact. For example, in 2007, UNRWA provided jobs and salaries for 25,000 
employees (most of whom were refugees), making it the single largest employer in the region.25 
Every time their mission becomes more challenging due to political changes and territorial 
losses, UNRWA adapts its approach and uses diplomatic channels to continue its mission. For 
example, after the Six Days' War resulted in the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 
UNRWA negotiated The Comay-Michelmore Agreement with Israel, where the latter pledged 
their support to cooperate with UNRWA officials working in these areas. Furthermore, when the 
Second Intifada of 2000 caused many oppressed UNRWA employees in Gazan camps to desire 
participation in retaliation, the organization maintained their dedication to UN principles and 
provided humanitarian assistance to both sides of the confrontation26. Due to UNRWA's great 
regard for diplomacy, this UN organization has maintained its operations in the most difficult of 
circumstances and even superseded its mission; causing an increased level of support for its 
beneficiaries and an alleviation of suffering in the region which would not have been possible 
otherwise. 
D. The Issue of Palestinian Refugees 
Palestinians consider the crisis of 1948 to be a central issue in their conflict with Israel, 
referring to the time as “al-Nakba” (“the catastrophe”). After the mass migration of refugees in 
the 1948 war, Palestinians who fled their homes joined others who had been forcibly removed, 
 
24 Wijewardane, 2007. 
25 Wijewardane, 2007. 
 
26 Wijewardane, 2007. 
18 
 
deported, or displaced in years prior. Today, the question of who constitutes a Palestinian 
“refugee” is debated27. There are internally displaced persons (such as those who fled to the West 
Bank, East Jerusalem, and Gaza) and external refugees (those who fled to neighboring countries 
or traveled beyond non-Arab states). Since both groups left their homes and livelihoods, they 
consider themselves “refugees” and are looking for reparations to consider this issue resolved. 
Palestinians hold onto the right to return to their pre-1948 land, and "they demand financial 
compensation and for Israel to acknowledge and accept some responsibility for the historical 
wrong done to the Palestinian refugees."28 Following al-Nakba, The Right of Return for these 
refugees was supported in UN General Assembly Resolution 194. Section 3 of this resolution 
even called for refugees to receive compensation from Israel and the international community. 
Despite these resolutions, every negotiation which has attempted an agreement between Israel 
and the Palestinians on the topic of refugees has failed to actualize any solutions for them. 
Israeli leadership views the issue of Palestinian refugees as a key component in the 
Palestinian "victim narrative" and a continuation of the Israeli implication of guilt, so Israel has 
an incentive to resolve the Palestinian refugee problem as well. However, Israel fears that if they 
allow even the original estimate of 700,000 Palestinians from 1948 the "Right to Return" to the 
state, then they will overwhelm Israel and undermine its nature as a Jewish state29. Regarding 
compensation, Israel is concerned that if they pay once for the rehabilitation of Palestinian 
refugees and Palestinians feel the amount is not sufficient, then Israel will suffer from perpetual 
demands from the international community and the Palestinian Authority. They are also deeply 
concerned with the Palestinian political rhetoric of the past, which encouraged Israel to be 
 
27 Brynen, p.31, 2018. 




responsible for the entirety of refugee reparations. Considering that before 1948, Palestinians 
constituted more than forty percent of the area that would become Israel's state, compensating all 
the losses alone would demand immense coordination and may cripple the Israeli economy. 
Furthermore, Israeli leadership has brought up demanding compensation from Arab states for 
the Jewish refugees who similarly fled to Israel from Arab countries. According to the Israeli 
narrative, many Palestinians fled their homes freely of their own accord, and the repossession of 
their lands was something a functioning state like Israel had to pursue once it became clear that 
the former residents would not be soon returning. Israel now had to absorb the Jewish 
immigrants who fled Arab states (perhaps out of a similar fear of persecution), plus the Jews 
emigrating Europe and other regions to make "aliyah"30 to "the newly liberated" Jewish 
homeland. Israel uses this narrative to justify their actions after the 1948 war, when several 
policies were passed to determine ownership for the "abandoned" Palestinian lands and build the 
state.  
A 1950 Israeli law regarding abandoned property gave rights over the land to the Israeli 
Custodian of Absentee Property; a position devised to look after the land who typically granted it 
to new Jewish settlers31. Supposedly, this law kept a record of the land to yield it to the original 
owners if they ever returned. However, subsequent laws such as the 1954 Offences and 
Jurisdiction Law may point to the intention to permanently retain the lands for Israelis by not 
allowing the previous residents to return. This later law criminalized the return of Palestinians 
based on the sovereignty of the Israeli state, sanctioning their deportation and imprisonment as 
 
30 Dowty, p.34-38, 2012. 
 
31 Dowty, 2012. 
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illegal immigrants should they try to return. Contrary to these policies, empirical polls have 
shown that the modern Israeli citizen seems to support some form of a compensation plan for 
Palestinian refugees. In a 2016 poll from the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research 
and Tel Aviv University, a majority of Israelis stated they were not opposed to Israel offering a 
compensation deal to internal Palestinian refugees living in camps, and even more stated they 
were not opposed to coupling compensation and a permanent settlement package with a two-
state solution.32 This data may point to a disconnect between the political narrative of Israeli 
authorities and the Israeli public's opinion concerning refugees and the larger conflict. 
In the Palestinian conflict narrative, it is essential that "restorative justice" occurs for 
refugees. Restorative justice is a Conflict Resolution concept indicating that the offended party 
should be granted reparations to restore what was lost, instead of taking punitive actions against 
their offenders.33 Palestinians ask for a return to the land which they lost in 1948 to compensate 
for al-Nakba, supporting their claim with the premise of international law. The Right of Return 
(“al-Awda”), is a term which Palestinian nationalists have adopted from international law, stating 
that “displaced people have a fundamental right to go back to their country of origin”34. 
Consequently, the Palestinians use these resolutions to appeal to the international community, 
remind them of their supposed promises in past negotiations, and make Israel appear to be 
violating international law. Lastly, appealing to the highest law also shows credibility for the 
cause of a stateless people, who perhaps feel that they cannot place their trust in local legislation. 
 
32 Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research and Tel Aviv University, p.5, 2016.  
Question V8-10 shows support for permanent settlement and compensation package. Question 
PV11.4 shows support for compensation and settlement for internal refugees. 
33 Zehr & Mika, p.48, 1998. 
34 The United Nations General Assembly, 1948. 
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As the years go by, it becomes more difficult for Palestinians who were 1948 refugees to claim 
the land in Palestine as theirs, especially if they have become citizens of a new country or if their 
families have grown. The descendants of refugees complicate the Right of Return further 
because they were never natural citizens of Palestine, but it is still considered by many to be "the 
country of origin" for their family. 
When it comes to dispensing compensation for refugees, the disparity between Palestinian 
expectations and Israeli concessions stands in the way of progress. Palestinians discuss 
compensation in terms of public and private land and include all registered refugees.35 
Conversely, Israel would like to pay a flat rate, possibly to an international fund that can 
contribute the rest of the funds needed to rehabilitate the original 1948 refugees alone.36 This 
stance seems insincere or inconsistent to Palestinians who have seen Israel substantially provide 
for Jewish refugees or pay reparations to Jewish settlers in the past. For example, when Israel 
withdrew its troops and settlers from the Gaza strip in 2005 to leave the Palestinians to govern 
themselves, they provided for the resettling of displaced Israeli citizens. These settlers received 
more than one billion U.S. dollars, and they were fewer than 9,000 people.37 Furthermore, Israel 
desired that these settlers move mainly for demographic reasons to maintain a Jewish majority in 
other places. The Israel Law Review states that Palestinians "would further note that settlement 
activity is considered illegal under international law, while Palestinian refugees are themselves 
the victims of forced displacement, making the difference in compensation levels even more 
difficult to swallow."38 Finally, since the dignity of refugees is intrinsically tied to the issue of 
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reparations, it is worth noting that feelings of an "inadequate" compensation could cause more 
significant harm to Palestinians than receiving no compensation at all. 
While the international community fails to respond, Palestinian refugees waiting on the Right 
of Return rely on the global agency that has consistently registered, educated, and generally 
cared for them and their families' immediate needs. As mentioned, UNRWA is a relief and works 
agency established under UN Resolution 302 in 1950 to focus exclusively on Palestinian 
refugees39. UNRWA has "contributed to the welfare and human development of four generations 
of Palestine refugees."40 From caring for around 750,000 refugees at its beginning, it now serves 
approximately five million.41 With the Right of Return consuming refugee negotiations on the 
state and international level, neither Israel nor the Palestinian Authority have dedicated their time 
and resources to the physical treatment of refugees. UNRWA and hundreds of grassroots 
organizations have attempted to answer the call; however, American support for Israel and the 
authoritative challenge Hamas poses to the Palestinian Authority have caused a shortage of funds 
and unequal treatment for certain groups of refugees. 
The quality of life for internal refugees is the cause for much humanitarian concern, 
particularly in Gaza. Gaza's limited access routes are controlled by Egypt and Israel, meaning 
that the 1.9 million Palestinians who reside there have no control over what enters and exits. The 
reason for Gaza's staunch blockade by Israel since the Second Intifada is cited as fear of 
terrorism by Hamas, the party which has de-facto control over the Gaza Strip and has built their 
platform on violent resistance towards Israel. Hamas pushed Fatah out of their joint government 
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in Gaza in 2007, approximately two years after Israel chose to withdraw all forces and settlers 
from the strip. Although Israel's security concerns revolve around Hamas, not one route under 
their legal governing body, the Palestinian Authority. When it began the blockade (which was 
also enforced by Egypt on its part), Israel stated that the two countries no longer trusted the 
Palestinian Authority to maintain control within the strip. For the 1.3 million refugees living in 
Gaza, this blockade has meant unpredictability in access to goods, medicine, and other services. 
Moreover, it means no freedom of movement from the eight recognized camps, which have one 
of the highest population densities in the world42. 
Overall, it is estimated that more than 800,000 Palestinians have been subjected to forced 
displacement under Israel, many of whom were refugees from the 1948 war.43 External refugees 
have likewise faced being displaced multiple times, due to the "Black September" massacre in 
the 1970s, the Lebanese Civil War, the First Gulf War, Gadafi's expulsion of Libyan Palestinians 
in 1995, the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, and the ongoing crisis in Syria, to name a few. In 
1949, the UNHCR was established to offer protection for refugees, including improving their 
circumstances. This agency works to resettle refugees in other states or repatriate them if their 
condition is no longer deemed actively hostile. Until Israel recognizes the Palestinian Right of 
Return, the vast majority of Palestinian refugees cannot be repatriated. Despite that fact, both 
internal and external refugees continue to advocate for a Right of Return, even though it has 
traditionally meant receiving neither compensation nor equal treatment under foreign rule in the 
meantime. 
 
42 UNRWA.org, “Where We Work: Gaza Strip”, 2020. 
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In conclusion, the question of Palestinian refugees has been aggrandized to a fundamental 
disagreement between Israeli and Palestinian narratives of the conflict. Both sides appear to see 
the need for a resolution, and public conception of the refugee problem may not be echoed by 
each group's formal leadership. The Right of Return and compensation are the two prevailing 
ideas to resolve this issue. While there is disagreement on these solutions' implementation and 
scale, the problem becomes exceedingly more challenging to solve. During the interim, the 
appalling conditions in Gaza and those living in refugee camps have caused the international 
community to seek mitigation of the conflict by improving refugees' lives with humanitarian aid 
and resettlement services. Although a permanent solution has not been found, hope remains; new 
leadership, a change in acknowledgment of the struggle for refugees, a change in the Gaza 
blockade, or an international agreement to provide compensation would all be unprecedented 
events which could occur in the future, leading to a change in status for Palestinian refugees. 
E. Past Peace Deal Failures and Scholarly Recommendations for Improvement 
Peace deals have historically struggled to provide lasting solutions in this conflict. The 1948 
war resulted in damage and distress to approximately 700,000 refugees, forming a Chosen 
Trauma passed down from generation to generation. While their frustration over the lack of a 
resolution grew, human rights violations have escalated in Gaza and Palestinian refugee camps. 
There have been many attempts in the past to resolve at least the refugee crisis, but they have 
failed to listen to the concerns of both sides, failed to calculate realistic estimates, and have been 
aimed at "Track I Diplomacy" (diplomacy between political elites) for solutions alone.  
The first significant peace deal of this kind occurred one year after the 1948 war, when the 
United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (UNCCP) worked with Israel and refugee 
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groups to calculate property lost by Palestinians and resettle some of them44. In their proposal, 
the international community would help facilitate about 100,000 refugees, and Israel agreed to 
pay some compensation for their property losses45. That plan came the closest to Israeli 
agreement for a Right of Return, covering both resettlement and monetary compensation for 
external refugees. However, it was seen as a "Band-Aid solution" for the following reasons: 1) It 
only covered one-seventh of those estimated to have been displaced in al-Nakba, 2) The 
compensation would exclude "war damages" and the total value of the property that Arab states 
had taken from Jews in 1948, and 3) The majority of refugees relocated under this plan would be 
settled outside Israel-Palestine46. Consequently, the project was rejected by both parties. A 
similar proposal was issued in the Clinton Parameters. The Clinton Parameters proposed both a 
return of refugees to "historical Palestine" or "to their homeland" and some form of monetary 
compensation, given by the international community and facilitated by the United States47. The 
addition of financial compensation could be a valuable solution for external refugees who are not 
living in camps and have been comfortably resettled in other countries, because their families 
may not desire to permanently rebuild their lives in Palestine again. However, acknowledging 
their claim to a Right of Return, increasing their ease of access for visiting the Palestinian 
territories, and providing financial compensation for their families might be a suitable substitute.  
Therefore, instead of a plan to completely repatriate all refugees, a successful project 
should incorporate financial compensation for those who cannot or do not wish to be repatriated. 
A potential pitfall of this solution could be resistance from Palestinians who feel like they are 
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trading financial compensation for the Right of Return. To avoid this, a successful peace 
proposal must carefully offer refugees compensation (and allow them to reject it), representing 
the money as "something which they are owed" and something that grants them the agency to 
leave an unhealthy environment if they are currently residing in one. They should be encouraged 
to hold on to the Right of Return since it is strongly tied to their conflict narrative. If done 
correctly and respectfully, sufficient compensation may lead to a greater willingness to cooperate 
with Israel on another peace agreement to resolve the other major issues in this conflict. 
Cooperation and a renewed relationship between Israeli leadership and the Palestinian Authority 
is perhaps the only way to re-open the door to a physical Right of Return offer which may be 
agreed upon by both sides. 
On the other hand, another danger of suggesting financial compensation for refugees is 
resistance from the Israeli side. When the Madrid Conference occurred in 1991, the Israeli-
Palestinian negotiations resulted in both sides acknowledging the importance of looking after the 
1948 refugees. After Oslo, the refugee question officially became a final status issue again48. 
Yet, when these conversations attempted to draw up refugee compensation, Israel was concerned 
that paying reparations would indicate that they had committed a one-sided wrong49. Perhaps, for 
this reason, Prime Minister Netanyahu continues to ask Arab states to compensate Israel for their 
1948 Jewish refugees if Israel is expected to compensate the Palestinians. Some scholars suggest 
it is better to avoid the term "reparations" in a peace deal for this reason, and the United Nations 
has historically preferred the time "compensation" instead.  
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Another spoiler for compensation in the past was coupling it immediately to promise a 
Right of Return. The Clinton Parameters plan never came to fruition because the Israeli 
government felt threatened by the prospect of being suddenly overwhelmed by nearly five 
million refugees. Instead, a successful proposal should attempt to assess which groups of 
refugees would like to return and harmonize that with how many refugees Israel feels they can 
accept per year. Perhaps a slow "trickle of refugees" can be agreed upon that would allow for the 
Israeli economy and population to adjust, and other groups of refugees who are more 
permanently settled would consent to receive compensation on the condition that they do not 
overwhelm Israel too. Even though the Palestinian rhetoric is to never give up the Right of 
Return, many well-settled refugees would like to visit their homeland rather than rebuild a new 
life there from scratch again50. It will take significant work on the ground to estimate the 
refugees who wish to return and those who want to receive compensation and count the 
maximum possible number of refugees that Israel may be willing to accept before proposing it. 
For this reason, Track III diplomacy efforts are necessary to perform the groundwork and 
convince both parties, perhaps at the community level, that this is their best option for a refugee 
solution. 
Instead of relying on out-of-touch political spokesmen, diplomacy efforts need to be 
expanded to include influential non-government actors and even grassroots organizers (known as 
"Track II" and "Track III" diplomacy, respectively). Scholars have pointed to the pivotal role that 
influences but "average" people played in other violent intractable conflicts, such as the conflict 
in Northern Ireland, where Catholic priests and businessmen became key diplomats in the 
solution for peace. For this reason, it has been suggested that a successful peace proposal should 
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also focus on the community level, including the religious sector. To be successful, this type of 
recommendation needs to incorporate religious people from both sides, who have not been 
previously included in the conversation about refugees and hold much influence in their 
communities. Secular leaders usually facilitate all peace process negotiations and international 
leaders, who are out of touch with community values. From among Israelis and Palestinians, 
there could be a representation of Reform, Orthodox, and Haredi Jews, Sunni and Shi'i Muslims, 
and Catholics and Orthodox Christians in a conversation about refugees. However, each group's 
representation in the intervention plan may be based on their proportion in the refugee population 
in question. 
Another refugee intervention strategy has been the structural improvement of refugee 
camps. Many cities were inundated with 1948 refugees who have become regular citizens, such 
as Amman. However, particular areas such as Al-Sabinah and Zarqa, are designated refugee 
"camps." Of the five million estimated refugees, roughly one third live in fifty-eight recognized 
refugee camps in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip51. In these camps, 
the quality of life is usually reduced since the host country allowed refugees to live there with the 
mindset that they would be eventually returning. After all this time, the community has had to 
construct infrastructure which may not be ideal in their location. Temporary camps that have 
turned permanent are depleting scarce resources like water, and structural deficits (such as the 
poorly constructed sewage systems in the Burj Barajneh Camp) can impact their health, hygiene, 
maternal and infant mortality rates, and free time. In December of 2009, the European Union 
supported a refugee camp rehabilitation project for UNRWA, which included a new water 
system and sewage network for Burj Barajneh, the most overpopulated camp neighboring 
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Beirut.52 However, these projects may no longer be possible due to the recent defunding of 
UNRWA by its largest donor, the United States. Around $200 million in Palestinian aid was cut 
under the Trump administration in 201853. The organization's chief accused President Trump of 
withdrawing UNRWA funds in retaliation for Palestinian protests regarding the Jerusalem 
embassy decision54. Considering the closure of the PLO office in Washington, DC, and the 
public statements made about the United States' unwavering support for its friend and ally, 
Israel, the United States may be removing itself from responsibility for the Palestinian cause in 
general. If this is true, perhaps a successful peace proposal should seek to supply a new donor to 
the Palestinian cause, appealing to the European Union or other UN member states. 
 
IV. Methodology 
A. Research Design  
For this study, I have relied heavily on qualitative data composed of primary sources. I aimed 
to conduct at least ten interviews online with participants from Jordan. I chose a qualitative 
design because this research is a case study into the personal thoughts and feelings of aid 
workers and government officials, to report their perceptions of how the "deal of the century" has 
affected and may affect their work in meeting the needs of the Palestinian people. I conducted 
these interviews virtually, via video and phone, because of the inability to conduct in-person 
meetings due to the outbreak of COVID-19. Additionally, I used qualitative data like newspaper 
opinion pieces and other relevant secondary sources to supplement my interviews' findings. As a 
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result of this topic's new nature and the possibility that it will change in a few months after the 
Biden administration transitions to power in the United States, there are few books and 
secondary sources written about the impacts of this deal. However, I have included the opinions 
of as many credible scholars and statements from international bodies as possible to position my 
interviews within a broader context. For my interviewing process, I began by reaching out to 
employees at aid organizations that have been actively working with Palestinians since the deal's 
proposal. I briefed them on the interview contents and my research topic, providing them with 
the "Informed Consent Form," which can be located under Appendix B of this paper. Then, I 
interviewed them through a prepared set of questions, which will include these topics: what they 
know about the "Deal of the Century," how they feel about significant components of the plan if 
they believe their organization and other organizations were impacted by it, how their 
organization is/is not responding to it if there is a need to partner with other Palestinian aid 
organizations if they believe it has changed the needs of Palestinian refugees if there are certain 
elements that make the Palestinian refugee cause unique, and what knowledge future peace deal 
creators should have. The full list of interview questions can be found in Appendix A at the end 
of this paper. 
B. Research Limitations  
This research should be viewed in the context of its limitations since the interviews only 
provide case studies of Palestinian aid workers and government officials in Jordan and cannot 
represent the entire population of people who assist Palestinians. Qualitative case studies were 
the most useful approach for my research since this research's overall goal was to discover 
whether Palestinian aid organizations feel the need to adapt to this latest peace deal, in the 
opinion of their employees and people who are knowledgeable about them. Additionally, I only 
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asked my participants questions over three months (October to December), which significantly 
limits the impact of my research conclusions over time, as politics change and the peace deal is 
or is not realized. Access to participants has also significantly limited the scope of my findings 
since I interviewed out of convenience, with the help of my contacts in the area. Interviewing out 
of a convenience sample means that I likely did not interview a balanced range of aid employees. 
The ramifications of COVID-19 also increased the barriers to access, so I interviewed fewer 
people than I probably would have if this research were conducted in person. 
Moreover, because I am a foreigner, an American citizen, and partially ethnically Palestinian, 
public perception may have led to biased answers from my participants. However, I took care to 
speak to my participants before the interview begins, and express to them that I am a student, 
that my research will only be used for educational purposes for the School for International 
Training, and that they will receive a copy of this research upon completion. Lastly, I have kept 
my interviewees' identities and the specific organizations they work for confidential and have not 
included any names or attributed any direct quotes to a single person/organization in this 
research. I hope that the extra confidentiality measures have given my participants the 
confidence to speak honestly about their opinions and helped eliminate some of the inevitable 
bias that comes with this interview process. 
C. Sample Selection  
This study featured a "convenience sample" style since the population was selected out of 
convenience from my Jordan contacts. I aimed to interview at least ten adults employed or 
formerly employed with aid organizations or the government in Jordan. I interviewed people 
whose organizations assist Palestinian refugees/IDPs, preferring employees whose organizations 
comprise Palestinians. The interviews were conducted with organizations and government 
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officials from Jordan because my practicum at the Jordan Health Aid Society International and 
first-semester schooling in Jordan facilitated my access to these groups. I did not limit the sample 
based on categories like gender, sexuality, ability, or marital status, because the only factors 
critical to this study were the person's relationship to an organization (employed or unemployed) 
and the length of employment. I limited the sample based on work because if participants had 
been out of contact with an organization for over a year, they might not have had sufficient 
information regarding the impact of the deal on the organization and its beneficiaries. I also 
limited the sample based on language and only selected people who were comfortable speaking 
English for the interview duration. It was vital that I not rely on a translator or try to conduct the 
interview in Arabic for ethical reasons. I wanted to avoid placing additional pressure on the 
interviewees by having an interpreter present, and English is the only language in which I am 
completely fluent. Lastly, I limited the sample size by age, selecting only adults for participation. 
The age limit was essential to ensure that all participants could fully answer for themselves and 
consent for my research involvement. 
D. Data Collection and Analysis  
I followed a question-based interview style to form the data set for this research. I have 
decided to conduct the interviews on an individual basis and developed a list of questions to 
guide the interview. I preferred a virtual interview approach rather than a self-administered 
questionnaire because I am interested in the participants' opinions and wanted to give room for 
interpretation and explanation. I selected an "open question" format, which means that 
participants could answer all my questions in their own words, rather than being limited to a list 
of options. I conducted the interviews solely in English without a translator and over the phone 
or by video call, depending on which choice made the volunteer most comfortable. I sourced my 
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participation subjects through contacts at the Jordan Health Aid Society International and 
through my supervisor, Dr. Bayan Abdulhaq. They put me directly in touch with individuals 
and/or organizations in Jordan involved in humanitarian assistance for Palestinians. I also 
reached out to my contacts within and outside of the School for International Training for advice 
on organizations interested in consenting to an interview. 
Additionally, I did not interview any person who had a close, personal relationship with 
myself to limit personal bias from the responses. The data was collected over three months, from 
October until the beginning of December, and it was compiled into this final capstone report 
during the same time frame. Any data not directly used in this final report was not shared with 
anyone else and deleted after five years (December 2025). Upon the conclusion of my research 
by mid-December, every participant will be provided with a digital copy of this final report for 
evidence of the data which I collected with their consent.  
E. Ethical Considerations  
I did not interview any vulnerable populations, relying entirely on adults who consented to 
the interviews and on publicly accessible databases for my secondary sources. It was of the 
utmost importance that I maintained the confidentiality of everyone I interviewed, especially if 
they confided details of their organization, their government work, or how the deal of the century 
had affected them personally. Therefore, I took care to never report details of their work that 
were not directly relevant to my research; and I avoided asking any questions that were not 
relevant, could evoke anger or embarrassment, or threaten participants' confidentiality. For this 
reason, my research did not begin until all approvals had been obtained from both my capstone 
advisor and through an Institutional Review Board, with the School for International Training's 
help. Additionally, I made it my policy to never record any employee names or descriptive 
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details of their situation, which were observed during interviews, which might have resulted in 
identifying an employee or their associates.  
I did not conduct any interviews with any person until I had obtained their consent to the 
interview via my Informed Consent Form and verbal approval over the phone directly before the 
start of the interview. I also answered any questions about the purpose of my research, my status 
and identity, and how the data I collected would be used. I emphasized my position as a student 
before the interview to limit any potentially uncomfortable power dynamics between the 
participants and myself. Lastly, I ensured that participants controlled the terms of the interview 
by explaining that they may refuse to answer any question at any time, stop the interview at any 
time, see any notes I took from the interview, and request for any information to be left out of the 
final report. After the interviews, all participants were emailed a copy of this final report. There 
were no incentives or benefits to anyone participating in this research besides gaining access to 
the final report. 
 
V. Findings 
I was able to interview a total of ten participants who were connected to Palestinian aid 
organizations in Jordan, through a virtual interview adhering to the descriptions in my 
methodology section above. All quotations in these findings come directly from interview 
responses, however they have not been attributed to the people who said them, to maintain 
confidentiality. If over 50% of interviewees stated the same (or similar) perspective, I have 
reported this to be the opinion of “a majority” of my participants. Similarly, if under 50% of 
participants stated the same opinion, I have reported this to be “a minority”, or the “opinion of a 
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few” interviewees. If only one participant stated something, I referred to this as an “outlier”. The 
following are the results of their interview responses, organized by the topics of the research 
questions I asked: 
A. “What do they know about the Deal of the Century?” 
While the particulars of the "deal of the century" are still unknown to many, it has been 
the cause of serious concern for those connected with Palestinian aid for the past year. All 
participants knew that the deal was devised by the Trump administration in the United States, 
after meetings and consultation with formal Israeli political leadership, without the consultation 
of any significant Palestinian leadership. 50% of participants were aware that it had allocations 
of land for establishing a “future” Palestinian state, and 50% were aware that there was a 
promise of investment of billions of American dollars for infrastructure. However, these figures 
were not comprised of the same people, with most participants being aware of either one or the 
other clause alone. 100% of participants were aware that under the deal, major concessions of the 
West Bank territory would now be classified as “Israeli land”. Additionally, all participants knew 
that the current Israeli and American administrations had not yet begun realizing every element 
of the deal. In particular, a majority of participants were aware that notable West Bank 
annexations and American investment in the region had been halted by a number of political 
reasons – ranging from protests in the region, to competing deals with Arab nations, to the U.S. 
Presidential election. Every participant was aware that former U.S. President Trump lost re-
election, and they all hope that this deal will never be enforced in the years to come. Lastly, 
while participants disagreed about what aid organizations should do in response, every single 
person I interviewed felt negatively towards the deal and its promises. 
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B. “Has the deal impacted their organization, and do they believe it will impact them in the 
future? Will they change their mission or vision? Will they partner with other orgs?” 
Participants disagreed about whether the proposal of the deal alone had a severe impact on 
Palestinian organizations, but a majority of them stated that they had been operating this past 
year under the assumption that it would be realized. Moreover, although President Trump may 
not be in office in the future, this deal has set a precedent of virtually unlimited support for 
Israel, and the majority of people I interviewed did not believe that fact will change in the near 
future. Some people disagreed about whether the deal was still on the table with President-elect 
Biden's new election. These individuals stated that the deal would leave with President Trump 
because its details were unrealistic and developed without the inclusion of Palestinian leadership 
in the first place. Yet, regardless of whether they believed the deal would die out or be actualized 
in the future, all interview participants treated the announcement of the deal as "nothing new" in 
their eyes. Many stated that the United States has had a long history of backing Israeli territorial 
expansion and their quest for international recognition at Palestinians' expense. Therefore, a 
more extreme pro-Israel deal was expected from President Trump, whom they believed would 
back this status quo.  
Before the U.S. election, the general consensus was that other Palestinian organizations will 
act the same and treat the United States as a "lost cause" if President Trump won reelection, and 
not waste time trying to appeal to American officials for aid or a renegotiation of the deal. 
However, since the election, most people responded that even if the U.S. continues to be pro-
Israel, there is a possibility that this particular deal will not come to fruition. For that reason, they 
believe Palestinian organizations should be proactive in spreading information about how 
dangerous the effects of this deal would be for refugees and Palestinian citizen's rights; to 
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prevent any aspects of the deal from being realized by the future Biden administration. When 
asked what aid organizations were doing in response to the deal's announcement, participants 
stated that their organizations were all cautiously watching to see if it would be realized, while 
continuing “business as usual”. According to their interviews, none of the organizations did 
change their mission, objectives, or seek new partnerships. A few individuals felt a great deal of 
stress and disappointment about the deal, but they stated that all they could do was hope it would 
never be actualized; because it would be impossible for them to change the desires of the 
Palestinian people whom they serve (and therefore impossible to change their overall 
organizational goals). 
C. “Will the needs of Palestinian refugees change because of this deal? Have they felt the need 
to prepare for a change in refugee rights/status?” 
When two powerful states, the U.S. and Israel, dictated that there is "no Right of Return" 
for refugees to their homeland, Palestinian organizations struggled to redefine what "refugee 
rights" would entail. Per their mandates and international law, Palestinian refugees' rights must 
involve a Right of Return. Therefore, the most likely outcome was that these organizations 
simply refused the deal's definition of refugee rights on the basis that neither the U.S. nor Israel 
have the authority to dictate those rights. 
When I asked if the needs of Palestinian refugees have changed, everyone replied that 
refugees' most desired need is an end to the years of conflict; and they do not believe a 
successful end to the dispute will be reached until Palestinians have a state. Thus, in the 
meantime, aid organizations are continuing to meet refugees' needs by providing them with the 
assistance they require to survive until the point in time where they can have a state. Many 
participants shared the sentiment that aid organizations will continue to operate according to 
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their current standards, backed by the UN, "in the face of deals and treaties coming from other 
countries to govern Palestinian lives and land." 
D. “What do their organizations rely on to prove the legitimacy of their work? Will other 
Palestinian aid organizations act similarly to theirs in response to the deal?” 
On the matter of refugee rights, these organizations have strong backing from the United 
Nations' texts and the example set forth by other Palestinian relief groups. In response to the 
deal, the organization UNRWA fell back on Resolution 194 as they have done in the past; and 
continued advocating for a Right of Return to formerly Palestinian lands. My interviewees have 
always relied on international law and a local element that many described as akin to the "values 
of the Palestinian people" to prove their work's legitimacy. Therefore, as long as they hold true to 
their constituents' values and can point to international law (such as UN Security Council 
Resolutions 194, 242, and 338), then their daily actions remain unchanged. 
E. “What do they think about the plan's claim to eventually give territorial expansion for 
establishing a Palestinian State? What do they think about the claim to eventually grow 
investment by 50 billion U.S. dollars in ten years?” 
Aid workers seem pessimistic about the deal's promise to provide Palestinians with “land 
roughly comparable in size to the West Bank and Gaza for establishing a future Palestinian 
State”. According to my participants, a Palestinian state's goal is to have authority over the lands 
from the 1967 territory, based on UN Resolution 242. Therefore, it is not acceptable to 
Palestinian leadership for a peace deal to ask Palestinians to give up even more land for a 
"potential" state in the future with land "comparable" in size to the already-diminished land they 
hold in 2020. While the deal recognizes the Palestinian desire for a state in the abstract sense, it 
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does not seem to make realistic plans for the state's location or timeframe to be established. 
Considering that the desire for a state was previously named as "the most basic need of refugees" 
by my interview participants, this peace deal has failed to meet the one requirement which 
Palestinian leadership absolutely must have incorporated into a peace deal: their statehood.  
Interviewees were also skeptical of the deal's promises of an airport, a tunnel connecting 
Gaza to the West Bank, and a capital in East Jerusalem. Participants remarked that, if any of 
these promises come to fruition, it will likely be the investment of money into the region. As part 
of the deal, United States investment in the region is supposed to grow Palestinian infrastructure 
and bolster the Palestinian economy by the amount of "about fifty billion U.S. dollars" within ten 
short years55. However, with a new presidential administration and changing foreign aid 
opinions, this extreme growth project may not happen. Even if it does, each person interviewed 
said that Palestinians will feel that this amount is a "pay off" which they are not willing to accept 
in exchange for their true desires (a universally-recognized state with Jerusalem as its capital, the 
Right of Return to the land, rights over the resources in their land, and the removal of settlements 
in Palestinian territory). One of my participants stated that the politicians who crafted this peace 
deal were “thinking like businessmen” and were too focused on economic methods of achieving 
peace. Another person echoed this sentiment, saying that money is not the key issue for 
Palestinian assistance because "you cannot buy justice." Clearly, these individuals agreed that a 
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After listening to my participants and conducting this extensive research on the deal, I 
have also formed my own conclusions. A majority of my interview participants stated that they 
had been operating with Palestinian aid organizations for the past year under the assumption that 
the “deal of the century”, a deal which they were staunchly opposed to, would be realized. While 
my interview participants disagreed on the severity of impact which the mere proposal of the 
deal had on their work, I believe this fact alone implies negative consequences for their mentality 
and the wellbeing of their mission. Regardless of whether the deal will be actualized in the 
future, it is clear from my participants answers that it has already negatively impacted Palestinian 
aid organizations. The responses from my participants reflect what scholars at SWP and reporters 
from Al Jazeera and The Jerusalem Post predicted when pointing out that the language of the 
deal disempowers Palestinian leadership, threatens refugee welfare, and could limit where aid 
organizations are allowed to operate in the future. 
Furthermore, I believe that the formal codification of these norms has made this deal a 
hindrance for achieving "peace" or crafting a peace plan in the future. To echo one scholar from 
Intellectual Discourse, the possibility of the United States serving as a mediator in this conflict 
may not even exist anymore.56 He explains we have clearly chosen a "side" and served American 
interests to the extent that the United States cannot ever be trusted to be impartial. As somber as 
this outlook may seem, half of those whom I spoke to shared this opinion with me when they 
stated that the deal was “nothing new” and that the U.S. has repeatedly chosen to back Israeli 
territorial expansion in spite of international law. This half were also pessimistic that President-
elect Biden nor any other American President would reverse the promises made in this deal. As 
my participants explained, only a deal which offers Palestinians their one true desire, recognized 
 
56 Moten, 2018. 
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statehood, can lead to progress for peace. So far, we have not seen true consideration for a 
recognized Palestinian State proposed by United States peace negotiators for some time. 
However, the other half of my participants believed that a peace deal would necessitate 
the United States' participation. Yet, this proclamation was not based on the assertion that the 
United States could have a more pro-Palestinian leadership, which elevated the Palestinian voice 
to become a serious negotiator to Israel. Nor was it suggested that the United States could be an 
impartial mediator, because we would advocate for two states or a more equal state out of our 
desire to end the cycle of violence and uphold human rights. Instead, my other participants stated 
that the United States would have to be involved in a successful peace deal because we are the 
only nation who may have sufficient influence over Israel to stop the path of annexation and 
convince their leadership to consider another attempt at peace. These claims by my participants 
are validated by the scholarly analysis of the fragmented Palestinian leadership. With their 
divisiveness and competition for power, groups who claim to represent the Palestinian voice are 
not being taken seriously by the international community as leaders, nor capable of devising 
solutions for peace. Therefore, as their leadership currently stands, the Palestinian people need 
another strong ally – either to represent their voice in peace talks or to force Israel to the 
negotiating table. 
Lastly, I have concluded that Palestinian aid organizations may be the key to convincing 
our nation to act in the interest of the humanitarian crises which these organizations work to 
alleviate every day. They are the ones who stay to help vulnerable populations after the news 
headlines have lost interest in the latest violence in Israel-Palestine. They are the ones who 
remind the world of its international commitments to the Palestinian people and to everyone who 
suffers in this conflict. Therefore, I believe they are a voice to listen to when developing any 
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deals which involve their beneficiaries and affect their cause. When asked if there was anything 
people should know about the situation when crafting a peace plan in the future, all my 
participants said a version of the same thing: “Unlike the one-sided deal of the century, a 
successful peace plan needs to involve both parties. Both Israeli and Palestinian leaders need to 
feel they made a compromise instead of getting the best deal for their end.” I thought this point 
was particularly striking, considering that scholars have said the deal of the century cannot 
succeed for its partiality. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
Notable scholars have pointed out major issues with this deal which prevent it from 
becoming a “source of peace” and a “solution” to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, including: the 
exclusion of Palestinian leadership in its formation, the complicated nature of the Palestinian 
refugee issue, and its failure to consider lessons learned from past peace deal attempts. For all 
these reasons and more, Palestinian aid organizations feel they cannot accept the “deal of the 
century” in the best interest of their beneficiaries; and they would rather defer to functioning as 
they have before the deal’s existence. 
Due to reasons such as the division and devaluation of Palestinian leadership, the massive 
role of UNRWA, and the authority given to their organizations by international law, Palestinian 
aid workers have risen to the challenge of representing “the Palestinian cause”. Yet, particularly 
for Palestinian aid organizations, uninformed political decisions by foreign powers have 
complicated their work time and time again. As advocates for Palestinians everywhere, it is 
imperative that their concerns are listened to and incorporated into peace deals involving the 
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Palestinian people. As an American, I believe my government has failed to use our influence to 
be impartial mediators. In the future, the international community should defer to local aid 
organizations on both sides of the issue when attempting to resolve the humanitarian crises 
suffocating the region. 
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IX. Appendices  
A. Interview Guide 
1. Briefly speaking, what do you know about the "deal of the century"?  
2. What do you think people should know about the situation when crafting a peace plan?  
3. Do you believe that the "deal of the century" has impacted you or your organization? If you 
feel comfortable sharing any details of how it has impacted your organization, please feel free to 
share at this time. If you are not comfortable, please feel free to withhold any details and skip 
this question. 
4. Do you believe the needs of Palestinian refugees will change because of this deal?  
5. (In reference to Question 4) Why or why not?  
6. Has your organization taken any steps to prepare for a change in Palestinian refugee status?  
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7. What does your organization rely on to prove the legitimacy of your work? (Follow-up, if 
unclear: Does your organization rely strongly on international law for validity?)  
8. What do you think about the plan's claim to give Palestinians "significant territorial expansion, 
allocating land roughly comparable in size to the West Bank and Gaza for establishing a 
Palestinian State"? 
9. What do you think about the plan's proposal to grow investment by 50 billion U.S. dollars in 
ten years for the Palestinian people?  
10. Is there a need to partner with other organizations during this time?  
11. Has there already been, or do you believe there will be, a change in your organization's 
mission or vision statements? 
12. In your opinion, will other Palestinian aid organizations act similarly in terms of responding 
to the deal?  
13. In your opinion, what, if anything, makes the Palestinian refugee cause unique?  
14. Is there anything else you would like to add about this topic? 
 
B. Participant Informed Consent Form 
INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
Title of the Study: How Palestinian Aid Organizations Adapt to the Possibility of Further 
Annexation and Rights Abuses in the Wake of "The Deal of the Century" 
Researcher Name: Nadia Wiggins  
My name is Nadia Wiggins. I am a student with the SIT Master in Humanitarian Assistance and 
Crisis Management program. I would like to invite you to participate in a study I am conducting 
for partial fulfillment of my M.A. in Humanitarian Assistance and Crisis Management. Your 
participation is voluntary. Please read the information below and ask questions about anything 
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you do not understand before deciding whether to participate. If you decide to participate, you 
will be asked to sign this form, and you will be given a copy of this form.  
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY  
The purpose of this study is to research how organizations giving aid to Palestinians are affected 
by the U.S. President's plan to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This study is for academic 
purposes only because I am interested in this topic as a Humanitarian Assistance student. The 
study will establish how organizations assisting Palestinians will be impacted by parts of the 
deal, such as the proposed territorial, political, and economic changes. Since the deal is new, 
information about how people feel about this deal and how they believe they will be affected by 
the deal is precious.  
STUDY PROCEDURES 
Your participation will consist of an interview in English with me online or over the phone and 
will require approximately one hour of your time. The interview will ask, at most, these 
questions: 1. Briefly speaking, what do you know about the "deal of the century"? 2. What do 
you think people should know about the situation when crafting a peace plan? 3. Do you believe 
that the "deal of the century" has impacted you or your organization? 4. Do you believe the needs 
of Palestinian refugees will change because of this deal? Why or why not? 5. Has your 
organization taken any steps to prepare for a change in Palestinian refugee status? 6. What does 
your organization rely on to prove your work's legitimacy? (Follow-up, if unclear: Does your 
organization rely strongly on international law for validity?) 7. What do you think about the 
plan's claim to give Palestinians "significant territorial expansion, allocating land roughly 
comparable in size to the West Bank and Gaza for establishing a Palestinian State"? 8. What do 
you think about the plan's proposal to grow investment by 50 billion U.S. dollars in ten years for 
the Palestinian people? 9. Is there a need to partner with other organizations during this time? 10. 
Has there already been, or do you believe there will be a change in your organization's mission 
or vision statements? 11. In your opinion, will other Palestinian aid organizations act similarly in 
terms of responding to the deal? 12. In your opinion, what, if anything, makes the Palestinian 
refugee cause unique? (End of Questions)  
There will be no photography, no audio recording, and no video recording during your interview. 
Not every question may be asked of you, and we will skip any questions which may not apply to 
you. You may refuse to answer any question at any time for any reason. If you refuse 
participation, I will not contact you again for any reason. 
POTENTIAL RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS  
There are no foreseeable risks to participating in this study, and no penalties should you choose 
not to participate; participation is voluntary. During the interview, you have the right to not 
answer any questions or to discontinue participation at any time. You may ask me any questions 
about my status, purpose, and the research before our interview if anything is unclear to you. If 
you wish to see the information collected from our interview, I will give you access to the notes I 
wrote during our interview; and I will not permit any other person to see the information 
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gathered during our interview. If you are uncomfortable or wish to retract any of the answers you 
provided during our interview, I will delete them from my notes or even delete your participation 
entirely. The final report will not attribute any direct quotes to you and only include a summary 
to create a picture of the overall results. You will also be provided with a copy of the final paper 
at the end of December, so you can see exactly how the final product turned out.  
POTENTIAL BENEFITS TO PARTICIPANTS AND/OR TO SOCIETY  
There will not be any benefits for your participation in this research besides receiving a copy of 
the final report for your own use. Access to my final report could increase your information 
regarding Palestinian aid organizations and your understanding of the Trump administration's 
peace deal. When the research is completed, I will email you the final report. If you do not have 
an email readily accessible, we can discuss any other reception methods you would prefer.  
CONFIDENTIALITY  
I cannot promise anonymity. However, any identifiable information obtained in connection with 
this study will remain confidential. I will not collect any information from you unless you sign 
this form and consent to the interview. After you consent, I will ask you again verbally whether 
you would like to participate in this study on the day of the interview before we begin. I will only 
be using my official school email (nadia.wiggins@mail.sit.edu) for all email correspondences 
between us. Your intellectual property will be respected because I will not use any materials I 
find about you, nor any other research studies you may have participated in, nor any information 
you have shared outside of the single interview between us. If you are employed or were 
formerly employed at an aid organization, I will take care to never report the organization's 
details, which are not directly relevant to my research. The questions listed above are the only 
ones I will ask during the interview, so I will not be asking any irrelevant questions that could 
evoke anger or embarrassment or threaten your confidentiality. I will not record any names nor 
descriptive details of your situation that I observe during interviews, and I will keep my notes as 
general as possible to avoid identifying you. The only personal information I need to know is 
whether you are an adult (because I will only allow consenting adults to participate in the 
interview) and whether you are currently employed with an aid organization (but I will not 
record which organization). No matter who you are, you may refuse to answer any questions or 
stop the interview at any time. I will not allow anyone to see my notes about our interview. Only 
my advisor, Dr. Bayan Abdulhaq, will see my research paper's drafts before it is complete. Any 
notes, research, and unfinished copies of the document will only be stored on my personal 
computer at my home in Los Angeles and will never be accessed from a public computer or 
another's device. I will also take precautions not to share my computer with anyone else during 
the entire research period. My computer has facial recognition software, so no one else can 
access it. Once the research is complete, I will store the collected data for five years on the 
computer with facial recognition software. Once that time has elapsed, I will destroy all my notes 
(whether they were used for the report) by deleting the files on my computer. The piece will be 
finished by the end of December, so all data collected will only be accessed for four months, 
during the research period from October-December. After that period, the only data available 
will be that which made it into the final report, and the report will never be altered from that 
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period on. When the research results are published or discussed in conferences, no identifiable 
information will be used. 
PARTICIPATION AND WITHDRAWAL 
Your participation is voluntary. Your refusal to participate will involve no penalty or loss of 
benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. You may withdraw your consent at any time and 
discontinue participation without penalty. You are not waiving any legal claims, rights or 
remedies because you participate in this research study. "I have read the above and I understand 
its contents and I agree to participate in the study. I acknowledge that I am 18 years of age or 
older."  
Participant’s signature _________________________________Date__________  
Researcher’s signature _________________________________Date__________  
RESEARCHER’S CONTACT INFORMATION  
If you have any questions or want to get more information about this study, please contact me at 
nadia.wiggins@mail.sit.edu or my advisor at bayan.abdulhaq@sit.edu  
RIGHTS OF RESEARCH PARTICIPANT – IRB CONTACT INFORMATION  
In an endeavor to uphold the ethical standards of all SIT proposals, this study has been reviewed 
and approved by an SIT Study Abroad Local Review Board or SIT Institutional Review Board. 
If you have questions, concerns, or complaints about your rights as a research participant or the 
research in general and are able to contact the researcher please contact the Institutional Review 
Board at: School for International Training Institutional Review Board 1 Kipling Road, P.O. Box 
676 Brattleboro, VT 05302-0676 USA irb@sit.edu 802-258-3132 
